Thank you for following our multi-part research (Part I, Part II) into the possibility of a China/Asia market collapse and our hypothetical analysis of what that event might consist of and how it may play out. So far, we have discussed the Chinese housing market rotation as well as the recent trends within the past 7+ years, expansion and foreign investments made by many Chinese and successful Asian investors. All of this research raises some interesting questions for us to consider.

And finally, the BIG question:

What would it take for China/Asia to move from an investments/risk-taker mode to a protectionist/crisis mode?

One of the first things we need to consider is the expansion of credit that originated after the global market credit crisis (2008 to 2010) was still evident in China and Asia – although not quite as deep in form and structure as it was in the US, Canada, Europe and others. Our previous research reports show that China’s property market and equities markets were not subject to the types of deep declines the US and other established economies experienced.  This was likely because China, at the time, was still experiencing a middle stage economic expansion period where China could continue to fund and export enough raw and finished materials to keep their economy running at 6%+ without much issue. Of course, after 2015~2016, China was able to accomplish this by devaluing their currency, expending billions in reserves to build and product excess cities and finished material as well as foster and finance hundreds of large-scale projects throughout the globe (Africa, Europe, Asia, Mexico and South America).