In Ian Fleming’s 1959 spy novel Goldfinger, he makes mention of the Moscow Rules. These were rules-of-thumb for clandestine agents working during the Cold War in the Soviet capital, a notoriously difficult assignment. Among the quips included in the catalog were, “everyone is potentially under opposition control” and “do not harass the opposition.” Fleming’s book added another, “Once is an accident. Twice is coincidence. Three times is an enemy action.”

In economic and monetary terms, we have been living by that last one. It’s not enough to understand the repetition surrounding “reflation”, the latest (or last) being the third or fourth. There has been more to it than that. And as we move forward in what more and more looks like another cycle, there is every reason to suspect hidden enemy action.

The downturns associated with each of those are easy enough (unless you are Ben Bernanke, Janet Yellen, or an economist like them). It’s the pre-downturn phase that calls our attention and requires more discerning analysis.

In 2007 and even early 2008, there was no consensus about recession or subprime, let alone panic and economic collapse. That was because in the pre-collapse portion things would often look normal. This period was marked by what may have appeared to be intermittent concerns or outliers, often swiftly addressed by then-trusted central bankers. The world appeared to be still moving forward if somewhat alarmed as it did.

You can witness the buildup of concern in any number of ways, including, as above, oil and China. Throughout 2007 and the first half of 2008, it was as if nothing much was going on at all. Everything appeared to be normal, or, as in WTI, better than. It was more than enough to cloud what should have been very clear signals of grave danger ahead.

For both WTI as well as China, the situation repeated. Omitting the 2011 crisis almost entirely, largely because of that episode’s more European rather than Asian characteristics, starting in 2013 there grew the same murkiness preceding the clear downturn at the start of 2015 (or in the closing months of 2014, depending on definitions and specific indications). The “taper drama” of that summer was a precursor to what would become the “rising dollar.” Though it seemed at the time as if that was a serious event, there was little outside of it (the economic stats, for example, universally improved) to suggest it would have lasting effects.