August 2014 was the peak in the U.S. energy sector, as long time investors know too well. The Alerian MLP Index remains down by more than a third, and larger firms are increasingly abandoning the structure to become regular corporations (“C-corps”). The Shale Revolution has tested the old model of paying out 90% or more of cashflow. It worked when growth opportunities were limited, but nowadays every MLP has identified profitable areas in which to invest. Secondary offerings, how growth is financed, have found MLP investors to be unenthusiastic about reinvesting their dividends. This has in turn depressed MLPs as they’ve issued equity to unwilling buyers in order to finance their growth plans.“Simplification” which generally involves conversion to a C-corp with adverse tax consequences for existing MLP equity holders, allows access to a far broader set of investors. The hope is that they’ll be more willing to finance the growth opportunities presented by the Shale Revolution.

Given the resurgence in U.S. hydrocarbon production in recent years, weakness in the sector that provides transportation, processing and storage was not inevitable. The famous “toll-model” of MLPs should have simply meant that more volumes meant more tolls. One might have expected the exploration and production companies to over-reach in their giddy search for more fossil fuels. There’s a good reason for the old saying, give an oilman a dollar and he’ll drill a well. We’d add, give a pipeline operator a dollar and he’ll build another pipeline. MLPs have often sought growth with irrational exuberance. Rising leverage, distribution cuts and broken promises followed. Many concluded that the MLP model was broken; in fact, the MLP model was fine but not suited to financing a growth business. Energy infrastructure used to be synonymous with MLPs, but so many have abandoned the structure that the Alerian MLP Index is no longer representative.